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Supporters of smoking laws often argue that they do not harm restaurants, bars,
and ta� erns and may e� en raise their proﬁts. Opponents argue that owners cater to
customer preferences regarding smoking and that laws mandating speciﬁc smoking
policies will therefore negati� ely impact proﬁts of some ﬁrms. This article tests
hypotheses regarding how smoking laws affect seating allocations, using data from a
nationwide sur� ey of restaurant and bar owners. The empirical e� idence indicates
that smoking laws exert no signiﬁcant effect on seating allocations. Firms are shown
to allocate greater shares of seating to nonsmoking use when customers exhibit
stronger preferences for such seating.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Laws restricting smoking in restaurants
have been enacted in 32 states. Supporters of
these laws often argue that they do not harm
ﬁrms and may even raise their proﬁts.1 Re
cent studies, for instance, argue that outright
bans on smoking in eating and drinking
places have not adversely affected these es
tablishments, suggesting that smoking bans
either do not reduce demand or lower costs
for ﬁrms, which offsets sales losses, thus
leading to no adverse changes in proﬁts.
Opponents of smoking restrictions argue that
owners cater to customer preferences re
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1. Proponents of smoking bans also often argue
that, absent such restrictions, taxpayers are forced to
pick up part of the higher health care costs of smokers
in Medicaid, Medicare and private insurance programs.
However, Lee �1991a, 1991b� suggests that smoking bans
can not be expected to lower this type of externality. See
also a recent Congressional Research Service report for
Congress �Gravelle and Zimmerman 1994�, which ar
gues that it is likely that passive smoke risk has been
overestimated by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration. The July 1998 decision by U.S. District
Judge William L. Osteen also concluded after ﬁve years
of court proceedings that the EPA had wrongly labeled
secondhand smoke a class A carcinogen and that the
agency relied on faulty science to reach the conclusion
it wanted.

garding smoking. Some owners would ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to allow smoking throughout their
establishments, others to forbid all smoking,
and still others to accommodate both smok
ers and nonsmokers by investing in parti
tions, designating areas, creating smoking
patios or rooms, and�or investing in air ﬁl
tration systems. They argue that laws that
mandate speciﬁc smoking policies will there
fore negatively impact proﬁts of some ﬁrms.
Little economic research has been pub
lished on the effects of smoking laws on
revenues of restaurants, bars, and taverns,
and none has been directed toward the issue
of smoking�nonsmoking seating allocations.2
This article provides a framework for exam
ining how customer preferences inﬂuence
smoking and nonsmoking seating allocations
by owners�the primary policy that ﬁrms
unilaterally adopt in their attempts to deal
with the issue. Hypotheses regarding how
smoking laws affect seating allocations are
then tested using data from a nationwide
survey of 1,300 restaurant, bar, and tavern
owners. The empirical evidence indicates that
smoking laws exert no signiﬁcant effect on
seating allocations.
II.

ECONOMIC MODEL AND
TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

Without legal restrictions, policies adopted
by restaurants, bars, and taverns toward
2. See, for instance, M. K. Evans �unpublished data�,
Glantz and Smith �1994, 1997�, and Sciacca and Ratliff
�1998� for studies of the effects of smoking laws on
revenues of restaurants.

smoking are determined in much the same
manner as decisions regarding menus, prices,
and hours of operation. Proﬁt-maximizing
ﬁrms optimize on the basis of customer de
mand and costs. Decisions pertaining to
smoking policies simply allocate the air space
within ﬁrms between smoking and nonsmok
ing customers.3 The air space within an es
tablishment is considered just like any other
resource, and owners decide to cater solely
to smokers, to nonsmokers, or to both by
providing patrons with rights to smoke while
accommodating others through smoking�
nonsmoking areas and air ﬁltration systems.
The choice depends on customer preferences
and relative marginal costs.4 Predictably,
market segmentation naturally evolves where
ﬁrms cater more to smokers in markets dom
inated by smokers than in those markets
dominated by nonsmokers.
There may also be broad differences be
tween how owners of restaurants and bars or
taverns allocate seating. Customers of
restaurants are likely to prefer that owners
adopt different accommodation strategies
than would patrons of bars and taverns.
Restaurant customers tend to dine in one
location within ﬁrms, and therefore it is pos
sible for owners to designate sections for
smokers and nonsmokers, and this pre
dictably leads to a relatively high allocation
of nonsmoking seating. In contrast, cus
tomers of bars and taverns may prefer to
participate in various activities Ždining,
drinking, listening to music, dancing, and
playing pool, darts, and billiards. whereby
they move to different locations within the
establishment during their visit and interact
with different patrons. It is relatively more
difﬁcult and therefore costly to designate
areas for smokers and nonsmokers in bars
and taverns, and this predictably leads to a
relatively low allocation of nonsmoking seat
ing. Moreover, because of the interactive
atmosphere of bars and taverns, it is unlikely
that all nonsmokers wish to remain sepa
3. Lee �1991b� argues that owners of private estab
lishments have an incentive to internalize externalities
associated with smoking; see also Tollison and Wagner
�1992� and Boyes and Marlow �1996�.
4. Smoking policies may also be inﬂuenced by pref
erences of owners, managers, and employers, but it is
unclear that their preferences would override those of
customers when owners proﬁt maximize and hire in
competitive labor markets.

rated from their smoking friends Žand vice
versa., and therefore many bar and tavern
owners may ﬁnd it relatively unproﬁtable
Žand unpopular. to segregate these two
groups.
This reasoning leads to the testable hy
pothesis that the mix of smoking�nonsmok
ing seating is inﬂuenced by the smoking pref
erences of customers so that nonsmoking
seating allocations are inversely related to
the percentage of customers who smoke. It is
also possible that the smoking characteristics
of state populations may be a signiﬁcant
factor explaining whether state governments
pass smoking restrictions. We expect that
states with relatively few smokers are more
likely to pass smoking laws.
III.

DESCRIPTION OF DATA

Survey data collected by Roper Starch for
the National Licensed Beverage Association
is used to examine how smoking laws inﬂu
ence seating allocations. The survey was con
ducted by telephone interviews during the
period of September 5�12, 1996. All inter
viewing was conducted from the Roper
Starch central interviewing facility. The sam
ple consisted of owners�managers of 1,300
randomly drawn restaurants Ž650. and bars
or taverns Ž650. across the United States.
Samples were drawn in a statistically random
manner from national lists provided by Sur
vey Sampling, Inc., a major supplier of survey
samples to research organizations. To the
extent that the Survey Sampling lists include
most full-service restaurants and bars or tav
erns in the United States, the survey results
are applicable to all such establishments with
a maximum sampling error of approximately
plus or minus four percentage points for
each sample of establishments. The survey
instrument was developed by Roper Starch
and includes questions pertaining to seating
allocations, attitudes toward smoking laws,
strategies to deal with smoking�nonsmoking
customers, revenues, and projections of ef
fects of smoking laws on revenues.
IV. TESTING WHETHER SEATING
ALLOCATIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY
CUSTOMER PREFERENCES

Selected summary statistics demonstrate
that ﬁrms in the sample differentiate them
selves by a number of characteristics, includ

ing chain afﬁliation, age, and size. The range
of employment in bars and taverns is 0�158
workers, and for restaurants it is 0�300
workers.5 Firms also differentiate themselves
on how they cater to smoking and nonsmok
ing preferences of customers. Allocations
range from strict prohibition, mixes of smok
ing and nonsmoking seating, and smoking
allowed throughout establishments. For
restaurants, the average percentage of seat
ing that is allocated to nonsmoking is 54%,
while for bars and taverns it is 5%�this
difference is consistent with expectations.
Both types of establishments have cases
where smoking is entirely prohibited, and
both have cases where smoking is allowed
throughout the establishment. Of owners�
managers of restaurants who offer a non
smoking seating section, more than twothirds indicate that this is a product of their
own policy. For bars offering partial non
smoking seating, more than half of man
agers�owners indicate that this is a result of
their own policy. The data indicate that both
complete and partial nonsmoking environ
ments exist in private markets with and with
out smoking laws.6
Table I displays means and standard devi
ations associated with three variables: per
cent of seating allocated to nonsmoking use,
percent of smokers in the adult population,
and the percent change in the adult smoker
population over 1989�95, and for three sam
5. Zero workers means that the ﬁrm is entirely run
by the owner and�or family.
6. The data are limited in that they test the knowl
edge of owners about the source of the smoking law.
There were many local smoking restrictions in place
during the period when the survey was conducted; how
ever, most of the more restrictive laws were put in place
after 1996.

ples: all states, states with a smoking law,
and states without a smoking law. While the
average nonsmoking seating allocation from
states with and without a smoking law does
not differ signiﬁcantly, signiﬁcant differences
exist for the other two variables Žsigniﬁcance
at 5% level.. That is, states with smoking
laws tend to have fewer smokers and tend
to have much larger reductions in smoking
populations.
Figure 1 displays distributions of the
shares of seats devoted to nonsmoking in the
states with and without smoking laws. For
instance, 57% of ﬁrms in the states without
smoking laws devote 0%�20% of their seat
ing to nonsmoking use, as opposed to 62% of
ﬁrms in states with smoking laws. Within this
grouping, 52% of ﬁrms in states without
smoking laws actually devote 0% of their
seating to nonsmoking use, and 59% of ﬁrms
in states with smoking laws devote 0% of
their seating to nonsmoking use. At the other
extreme, 16% of ﬁrms in states without laws
devote 81%�100%, as opposed to 18% of
ﬁrms in states with laws. Within this group
ing, 14% of ﬁrms in states without smoking
laws actually devote 100% of their seating to
nonsmoking use, and 16% of ﬁrms in states
with smoking laws devote 100% of their seat
ing to nonsmoking use. Assuming that the
distribution surrounding ﬁrms in no-law
states is the expected distribution, the chisquare test indicates at the 5% level that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the distri
bution surrounding ﬁrms in smoking law
states does not differ signiﬁcantly from that
of ﬁrms in no-law states. Therefore, the dis
tribution of the shares of nonsmoking seat
ing does not appear to differ between these
two samples. It is important to note that this

TABLE I
Means and Standard Deviations

Nonsmoking seating
Ž% of total seating.
Smokers
Ž% of population.
Smoker change
Ž% change, 1989�95.

All States
( n � 1300)

States with Smoking Laws
( n � 968)

States without Smoking Laws
( n � 332)

29.5
Ž39.5.
21.6
Ž3.2.
�2.1
Ž2.4.

29.1
Ž39.9.
20.8
Ž3.2.
�2.9
Ž2.2.

30.6
Ž38.3.
23.8
Ž2.0.
�.003
Ž1.6.

Note: Standard deviations are displayed in parentheses below the means.

FIGURE 1

data set was developed in 1996 and may not
reﬂect the implications of de facto complete
smoking bans such as the one that now exists
in California.
Many other factors may also inﬂuence
allocations of seating into smoking�non
smoking designations. The size of a ﬁrm Že.g.,
number of employees. may inﬂuence deci
sions when scale economies exist in catering
to both smoking and nonsmoking popula
tions. A positive relationship between ﬁrm
size and nonsmoking seating allocations may
occur if larger ﬁrms may more easily sepa
rate smokers from nonsmokers. Whether an
establishment is a member of a corporate
chain or an independent ﬁrm may also affect
the allocation decision. Chain members may
offer greater accommodation as an element
in their overall corporate strategy. If this is
the case, then chain members would offer
greater nonsmoking seating allocations than
independents. Years in business may also
inﬂuence seating allocations, since estab
lished reputations may attract a different mix
of customers, and there may be differential
accommodation costs related to age of build
ings. It is possible that older businesses may

tend to accommodate less, given that their
owners tend to cater to more established and
stable customer bases than newer businesses.
Table II displays estimates from three re
gression equations.7 Column 1 contains esti
mates of an ordinary least squares regression
of nonsmoking seating on smoking laws.
Ž1.

NSi � f Ž Smoklawi . ,

where NSi � percentage of seating that is
nonsmoking
Smoklawi � 1 if smoking law present;
� 0 otherwise.
No signiﬁcant relation is determined by this
simple regression, thus indicating that smok
ing laws do not appear to inﬂuence seating
allocations of owners.
In column 2 of Table II, we instrument
for smoking laws with tobacco manufactur
ing in the state because there are various
factors relating to the social acceptability of
7. Signiﬁcant relations are assumed to be those
meeting statistical signiﬁcance at 5% Žtwo-tailed. levels
or greater.

TABLE II
Ordinary-Least-Squares Results
Dependent Variable
Constant
Smoking law
ŽYes � 1, No � 0.
Tobacco manufacturing

% Nonsmoking
seating

Smoking Law

30.57 a
Ž14.10.
�1.47
Ž�0.58.

0.76*
Ž62.75.

111.14 a
Ž9.09.

�.0001*
Ž�6.86.

Smoking law instrument
Smokers
% change in smokers
Chain member
ŽYes � 1, No � 0.
Years in business
Number of employees
Bar
ŽYes � 1, No � 0.
Adjusted R-squared
Mean dependent variable
F-statistic
Observations

% Nonsmoking
Seating

0.00
29.48
0.34
1,300

0.03
0.74
47.02
1,300

�3.17
Ž�0.31.
�2.17 a
Ž�7.96.
0.26
Ž0.57.
5.68 a
Ž3.08.
�0.09
Ž�1.83.
0.26 a
Ž6.60.
�45.14 a
Ž�25.89.
0.45
29.48
155.95
1,300

Note: t-statistics in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance at 1% level.

a

smoking that may inﬂuence the smoking law
variable that are hypothesized to separately
inﬂuence seating allocations as well. The
presence of a tobacco manufacturing facility
in a state serves as a good proxy for these
factors, since these facilities tend to be con
centrated in states where tobacco growing
and employment make up a large part of the
economy. States with a larger percentage of
people involved in the tobacco industry may
be less likely to pass severe restrictions on
tobacco use in general. Equation Ž2. is esti
mated by ordinary least squares:
Ž2.

Smoklawi � f Ž Tobmani . ,

where Tobmani � dollar value of state to
bacco manufacturing in 1994 Ž$M.. The to
bacco-manufacturing variable, which exerts a
statistically signiﬁcant and negative inﬂuence
on the smoking law variable, indicates that
states with sizeable tobacco manufacturing
will tend to not pass smoking laws.

Ordinary-least-squares estimation of
equation Ž3. tests the hypothesis that private
markets allocate nonsmoking seating subject
to the following variables: smoking law Žin
strument., incidence of smoking in the adult
population, changes in smoking incidence,
whether the ﬁrm is part of a corporate chain
or independent, ﬁrm size, years in business,
and whether the ﬁrm is a restaurant or a bar
or tavern.8
Ž3.

NSi � f Ž Smoklawi , S95i , S9589i ,
Chain i , Yearsi , Size i , Bari . ,

8. Variables obtained outside of the survey are:
smoking law is obtained from the Tobacco Institute’s
‘‘State Smoking Restriction Laws’’ �unpublished data�;
all other data obtained from the Center for Disease
Control. The smoking rate data measure the prevalence
of current cigarette smoking among adults, and are
generated by the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance
System. The tobacco manufacturing variable measures
cash receipts from tobacco large enough to be sepa
rately reported by the Center for Disease Control.

where S95i is the percentage of adult popu
lation that smokes, S9589i is the change in
percentage of adult population that smokes
from 1989 to 1995, Chain i is 1 if ﬁrm is part
of corporate chain;� 0 otherwise Size i is the
number of full- and part-time employees,
Yearsi is the number of years in business,
Bari is 1 if bar or tavern;� 0 if restaurant.
Equation Ž3. assumes that smoking laws
do not directly inﬂuence smoking behavior in
a way that would separately inﬂuence the
owners’ allocation of nonsmoking seating. A
counter-hypothesis�that state smoking laws
themselves may cause fewer citizens to
smoke�implies a simultaneous equations
bias in our estimation. However, while the
intent of some smoking laws is to decrease
smoking, the primary intent is to control
smoking, and especially exposure to second
hand smoke, within restaurants, bars and
taverns.9 While many advocates of smoking
laws might also prefer that smoking decline
outside of these establishments as well, this is
clearly of secondary importance for these
particular types of restrictions. Moreover, we
are unable to test whether smoking laws lead
to less smoking by customers Žand therefore
leads owners to allocate less seating to smok
ers. simply because this requires time-series
data that is unavailable. Such data may be
come available in the future, but at this
point we know of no other data that mea
sures seating allocations and none that pro
vides such a series over time.
It is also unclear that smoking laws would
signiﬁcantly affect smoking behavior because
of less-than-perfect enforcement. Anecdotal
evidence appears to suggest that those busi
nesses that would be most adversely affected
by smoking laws Ži.e., those catering to rela
tively high numbers of smokers. would also
prefer relaxed enforcement of smoking
9. Sciaca and Ratliff �1998�, writing in the American
Journal of Health Promotion, mention reduction in expo
sure of nonsmokers to ETS Ženvironmental tobacco
smoke. ﬁrst in the reasons for why laws prohibiting
smoking in restaurants are approved. They also suggest
that these laws provide an additional incentive and a
supportive environment for smokers to quit, but this
reasoning appears secondary in importance. Moreover,
California approved a total smoking ban in all restau
rants and bars based on protection of employees from
ETS, once again indicating that any effects on smoking
behavior outside of these establishments to be sec
ondary.

laws.10 To the extent that this is true, smok
ing laws may not be particularly effective in
lowering smoking�both within and outside
restaurants, bars and taverns�and in this
case may not be particularly effective in
changing owners’ allocation of nonsmoking
seating.11
Estimation results of equation Ž3. are pre
sented in the third column of Table II.12 The
smoking law instrument does not exert a
signiﬁcant effect on seating allocations. The
incidence of smoking in the adult popula
tion, however, exerts a negative and statisti
cally signiﬁcant effect on nonsmoking seat
ing. That is, ﬁrms allocate less seating to
nonsmoking use as the percentage of smok
ers rise in the population�a relationship
consistent with expectations. Change in the
nonsmoking population exerts no statistically
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on seating allocations.
As hypothesized, afﬁliations with a chain and
ﬁrm size are signiﬁcantly and positively re
lated to the percentage of nonsmoking seat
ing. As hypothesized, years in business exert
a negative effect on nonsmoking seating but
is only signiﬁcant at the 10% percent level.
Finally, the dummy variable for bars and
taverns exerts a signiﬁcant and negative in
ﬂuence on seating allocations, as consistent
with expectations.
That smoking laws are not signiﬁcant de
terminants of nonsmoking seating deserves
further discussion. The data for this analysis
were developed in 1996, prior to the estab
lishment of many highly restrictive local
smoking ordinances. In the case where smok
ing is banned Žand enforced. throughout es
tablishments �or is limited so that it be
comes extremely inconvenient to smoke�the
results of the analysis will not apply. How
ever, when smoking laws allow for the ac
commodation of both smokers and nonsmok
10. Newspaper articles on the smoking ban in Cali
fornia, for example, document widespread civil disobedi
ence; see, Blankstein �1998�, Canto �1998�, and Risling
�1998�.
11. Chaloupka and Saffer �1992� ﬁnd no evidence
that state-wide smoking bans in restaurants have any
effect on smoking as measured by cigarette consump
tion.
12. We included cross-effects between numbers of
employees and smoking law variables and between
smoking law and bar variables, but neither exerted
statistically signiﬁcant effects. In addition, while it would
be appropriate to control for intrastate correlation in
our regressions, this is not possible given the small
number of observations of many states.

ers, states with relatively high percentages of
nonsmokers also tend to have relatively high
allocations of space devoted to nonsmoking
uses. This suggests that, in many cases,
smoking laws are enacted ‘‘after the fact’’ in
the sense that they appear after the private
market has already reallocated resources in
proﬁt-maximizing ways. That is, ﬁrms ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to allocate more space to non
smokers, as these customers become more
important to their overall revenues. A smok
ing law will not alter allocation of space
when ﬁrms themselves have already met
smoking preferences of customers, provided
that the laws do not mandate that nonsmok
ing space signiﬁcantly exceed that provided
voluntarily by owners. Of course, another
interpretation may be that restrictive laws
are simply not highly enforced and are there
fore ineffective in altering nonsmoking space
within restaurants, bars or taverns.13
V. CONCLUSIONS

Proponents of laws restricting smoking
within restaurants, bars, and taverns argue
that they are necessary based on the belief
that owners will underallocate nonsmoking
seating in their establishments. This article
provides the following insights into this issue.
First, in the absence of outright smoking
bans, ﬁrms allocate greater shares of seating
to nonsmoking use when their customers ex
hibit stronger preferences for such seating.
In other words, the private market allocates
air space resources within ﬁrms with or with
out smoking restrictions, and it is unlikely
that removal of smoking laws would overturn
this result. In fact, there is no evidence that
smoking laws themselves affect the seating
allocation decisions, thus indicating that pri
vate markets have already dealt effectively
with the smoking issue in the sense that, in
the absense of outright smoking bans, ﬁrms
tend to voluntarily allocate in excess of gov
ernment mandates or that enforcement of
smoking laws is imperfect.
13. In this event, however, it would appear that if
these laws were enforced, they would tend to lower
proﬁts of some owners.

Second, the article suggests that the con
tinued decline of smokers as a share of the
population will encourage the owners of hos
pitality establishments to allocate more space
to nonsmoking customers. This reallocation
arises because of the proﬁt motive and ap
pears to be an active process within the
restaurant, bar, and tavern industries. Eco
nomic examination of the timing of these
decisions�how quickly do owners reallocate
their seating space to changes in numbers of
nonsmokers�would be a useful addition to
our research. At this point, however, timeseries data are unavailable that would allow
us to examine the speed of seating realloca
tions by owners toward nonsmokers.
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